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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2(j)) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended governing appeals transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue: Did the Trial Court error in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment
when there are substantial material facts in dispute in regards to an agreement?
Standard of review: The Appellate Court needs to review the Trial Court's
decision when the court erred in granting Summary Judgment when applying the relevant
law and whether there are material fact issues in dispute. See Snyder v Murray City
Corp., 2003 UT 13, 73 P.3d 325. Moreover, because an appeal from a summary
judgment involves only legal issues, the reviewing Court does not defer to the Trial
Court's ruling, but instead, determines whether a Trial Court correctly applied the law
and correctly determined that no disputed issues of material fact existed. Sittner v.
Schriever, 2001 UT App 99 ^ 7, 22 P.3d 784
Appeal Preservation: Appellant raised this issue in her Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as in the oral arguments. (R. 780-
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791.)
Issue: Did the Trial Court error in refusing to consider the Renewed Motion for
Intervention prior to Summary Judgment being granted?
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will overturn a denial of a Motion to
Intervene of there is a clear abuse of discretion. See State by and through Utah State
Dept. of Social Services v. Sucecx 1996, 924 P.2d 882.
Appeal Preservation: Appellant raised this issue in the Motion for Joinder of
Additional Involuntary Plaintiff (R. 453-456), Motion to Intervene (R. 475-477), and
Renewed Motion for Intervention (R. 792-802.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c):
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
U.R.C.P. Rule 24:
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an
6

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order
administered by a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation,
order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be
permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to
intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case: Sonja Jensen and William Jensen were married when
William Jensen began doing business with Santelli and the dialysis companies. During
their marriage they started a L.L.C., Focus Enterprises (R. 825), through their Family
Partnership. William Jensen entered into an oral agreement with Santelli on behalf of
Summit which terms were discussed and agreed upon from late Spring or early Summer
2001 through June 2003 giving William Jensen, through Focus, an eight percent (8%)
interest in Summit. (R. 811.) The Appellees breached the oral agreement which was
7

reduced to writing and has caused damage to Sonja Jensen. (R. 655-673.) William
Jensen, prior to being employed by Santelli and Summit, worked for Total Renal Care
where he had signed a non-compete agreement that was in effect when William Jensen
entered into the initial agreement with Santelli in approximately April 2001. (R. 819.)
On numerous occasions during April 2001 through May 2003, William Jensen was orally
informed by Santelli that William and Sonja Jensen would be compensated for their
services by being given a percentage ownership interest in the various entities that would
be formed for the various dialysis centers, more specifically Summit. (R.822-827.) On
June 19, 2003, the oral agreement was reduced to writing and Sonja Jensen, William
Jensen, and the Family Partnership, through Focus, were given an 8% ownership interest
in Summit. (R. 655-673 and R. 820-822.) However, the written agreement (R. 655-623)
was never signed for the reason that Appellees found out that William Jensen was soon to
be divorced from Sonja Jensen. (R.822-823.) On June 23, 2003, Mr. and Sonja Jensen
separated and a divorce proceeding was filed in August of 2003. Immediately after the
separation, Appellees, members of Summit, conspired with William Jensen to breach the
terms of the written agreement (R. 655-623) by removing the Jensens' interest through
Focus in Summit, so that William Jensen would not have to share his interest in Summit
with his soon to be ex-wife. (R. 822-823.)
Course of Proceedings: The Complaint was filed on the 11 of February, 2005
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wherein the Appellant's (Sonja Jensen) alleged that an oral agreement had been entered
into by and between Sonja Jensen and William Jensen through Focus Enterprises, owned
by Sonja and William Jensen through their Family Partnership and with Summit Dialysis
L.L.C. through its representative Robert Santelli which was reduced to writing. (R. 123.) On the 24th of March, 2005, Appellee William Jensen filed a Motion to Dismiss
Focus Enterprises L.L.C. and William A. Jensen Family Limited Partnership from the
case based upon his position that Sonja Jensen did not have the authority from the said
two entities to file the lawsuit on their behalf. (R. 103-105.) William Jensen's Motion to
Dismiss was granted June 21, 2006 (R. 472.) Sonja Jensen filed a Motion to Intervene
and Memorandum Support Thereof on the 1st of August, 2006 (R. 475-477) wherein
Sonja Jensen specifically stated that she now had the authority to pursue the litigation for
Focus and the Family Partnership. No opposition to said Motion to Intervene was filed
by William Jensen or any Defendant for the reason as stated in the Motion to Intervene
by Sonja Jensen that William Jensen had stipulated that Sonja Jensen had the authority to
proceed forward representing Focus and the Family Partnership. (R. 475-477.) Sonja
Jensen's Motion to Intervene was denied by minute entry on the 22nd of November, 2006
(R. 769) even though no opposition had been filed against that Motion and Sonja Jensen,
at that time, did have the authority to proceed forward on behalf of Focus and the Family
Partnership. On the 14th of November, 2006, the Appellees filed a Motion for Summary
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Judgment along with a Memorandum in Support Thereof, and Sonja Jensen filed an
opposing memorandum on December 7, 2007 (R. 780-791), and an affidavit on the 8th of
December, 2006. (R. 809-917.) On the 7th of December, 2006, Sonja Jensen, filed a
Renewed Motion for Intervention and a Memorandum in Support Thereof (R. 792-802)
requesting that the two plaintiffs, Focus Enterprises and William A. Jensen Family
Limited Partnership be allowed to intervene back into the action based upon the fact that
Sonja Jensen had the authority to represent the said two entities pursuant to a Stipulation
entered into by and between Sonja Jensen and William Jensen in the divorce action in the
above-entitled Court. On the 7th of February, 2007, the Court issued a Notice scheduling
oral argument (R. 1042-1048), although the Trial Court did not convey which motion
would be argued, and there were still two motions outstanding, one for Summary
Judgment and the other for a Renewed Motion to Intervene. On the 12th of February,
2007, Sonja Jensen filed a Notice to Submit the Renewed Motion to Intervene and a
Memorandum in Support thereof. (R. 1047-1048.) The oral argument was continued to
the 12th of March, 2007, when only the Summary Judgment motion was argued since the
Court had failed to review the file to determine that the Renewed Motion for Intervention
was also outstanding. (R. 1056.) The Court granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment and on the 29 of May, 2007, filed the signed Final Judgment from which this
appeal lies. (R. 1109-1112.) On the 4th of June, 2007, Sonja Jensen again filed a Notice
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to Submit for Ruling in regards to the Renewed Motion for Intervention along with a
Notice of Lodging (R. 1087-1094) and the Court, in a Minute Entry dated the 21 st of
June, 2007, denied said Motion. (R. 117-118.) The Notice of Appeal was filed on the
28th of June, 2007. (R. 1119-1120.)
Disposition Below: The District Court ordered a Final Judgment granting the
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the Court's finding that there
were no substantial and material facts in dispute to preclude a granting of Summary
Judgment. Sonja Jensen also requested that the above Court reverse the denial of the
Motion to Intervene and the Renewed Motion to Intervene filed by the Appellants Focus
Enterprises and the William A. Jensen Family Limited Partnership which was denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant was married to William Jensen when an oral agreement was entered
into by William Jensen and Sonja Jensen through an entity known as Focus Enterprises,
owned by Sonja Jensen and William Jensen through their Family Partnership, and with
Summit Dialysis L.L.C. (Summit) through its representative Robert Santelli. (R. 809-917
and R. 847.) The said oral agreement was reduced to writing after numerous discussions
regarding the ownership interest in Summit. (R. 655-673.) At the time of the agreement
for an ownership interest in Summit being reduced to writing, William Jensen was faxed
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a copy of the Agreement to be signed; however, the Agreement was not signed due to the
fact that William and Sonja Jensen were separated at that time, and William Jensen did
not want Sonja Jensen to have part of his interest in Summit. (R. 809-917.) In numerous
answers in her deposition Sonja Jensen explained the agreement that she was suing over
which was reduced to writing however, these explanations apparently were ignored by
the Court and misconstrued by the Appellees to infer that there was no agreement.
I
In review of the affidavit of Sonja Jensen and portions of her deposition, included
therein (R. 809-917), her statements supported and substantiated material issues of fact,
in regards to whether or not there was a contract or agreement. Specifically, in her
deposition, Sonja Jensen, refers to the agreements between Focus Enterprises and
Summit, as follows:
a.

On pages 29-40 (R. 819-821), Sonja Jensen talks about the

agreements between William Jensen, Sonja Jensen, and Robert Santelli on behalf of
Summit.
b.

On pages 34-35 (R. 820), Sonja Jensen was asked about the

allegation in her Complaint wherein she stated that the Defendants breached their
agreements with the Plaintiffs.
c.

On page 35 (R. 820), Sonja Jensen indicates that there were plural

agreements between herself and William Jensen, Focus Enterprises, and the William A.
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Jensen Family Limited Partnership and the Defendants, both verbal and written. She then
discusses (R. 821) the three written agreements, the first one being "Exhibit 10" to her
deposition, which was the operating agreement titled East Valley Artificial Kidney
Center, and the second one she mentions is West Valley Artificial Kidney Center,
although she did not have a copy of the same, and the third was the written agreement
drafted June 19, 2003 but dated July 1, 2003, (R. 821) which was "Exhibit 4" of Sonja
Jensen's deposition, and "Exhibit 7" to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. 655-673.)
d.

Further, on pages 29-40 of her deposition (R. 819-821) Sonja Jensen

refers to the eight percent interest in Summit owned by the Plaintiffs. She goes on and
refers to other dialysis centers in which she believes her husband also has an ownership
interest, and that he specifically stated to her that he had an ownership in. (R. 821.)
e.

On page 40 line 9 (R. 821) of her deposition, Sonja Jensen is asked

in regard to the three written agreements that she has identified being East Valley
Agreement, the West Valley Agreement from 2001, and the unsigned Second Operating
Agreement of Summit, again Exhibit "4" of her deposition (R. 655-673.)
f.

On page 40 line 20 (R. 821) of Sonja Jensen's deposition she is

asked, "Are there other unwritten agreements that you are referring to that were breached
in paragraph 51," which referred to unwritten agreements which were not reduced to
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writing, excluding the unsigned Exhibit "4" to her deposition. (R. 655-673.)
g.

On page 44 of Sonja Jensen's deposition (R. 722), she is asked in

line 10 "I want to know how many agreements you claim that the Plaintiffs had with the
Defendants when that the Defendants breached. You already told me about three."
Answer: Right. "I want to know if there are any more written or unwritten." Sonja
Jensen answered, "I believe there are others that are verbal, just like I told you about,"
then she answers in regard to suing for this lawsuit "No." So again, there are the three
contracts, one written, one missing, and one written but unsigned, which is "Exhibit 4" to
the deposition. (R.655-673.) Sonja Jensen, on page 46, line 5-18 of her deposition (R.
723) where the question was asked, "Tell me what the unwritten agreements were that
you are suing for in this lawsuit." Answer: "Well I've already said Pasadena and Austin,
and we decided they are not as part of this lawsuit, so that would be the end of the
answer." Question: "Okay, so there are no unwritten agreements that you are suing for—
?" Answer: "No." Question: "In this lawsuit? Okay." Then counsel goes on to state on
line 15, "With respect to the three written documents that you claim are agreements you
are suing under this lawsuit, what are the agreements for?" Sonja Jensen then explains on
pages 47-48 (R. 723) what they are for. Again, Sonja Jensen although stating there where
no unwritten agreements, said statement was made in the context that there were no other
un-executed or unsigned agreements other than the three written agreements which
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included the unsigned written agreement. (R. 655-673.) Although it was an un-executed
written agreement, it contained the terms of the oral agreement of the parties which is the
basis of the lawsuit. As Sonja Jensen stated in paragraph 3 of her Affidavit filed in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 810), "Affiant's answer of, "No,"
referred to no other written agreement other than what she had already stated and testified
to in her deposition."
h.

On pages 57-60 of her deposition (R. 822), Sonja Jensen again

discusses the written un-executed agreement which contained the terms of the oral
agreement, and the fact that William Jensen, through Focus Enterprises L.L.C. owned an
8% interest in Summit Dialysis L.L.C.
i.

Further, on pages 61 and 62 (R. 823), Sonja Jensen testified that the

8% interest in Summit was assigned to William Jensen in the unsigned written agreement
(R. 655-673), and the fact that his name or Focus was taken off was due to the fact of the
separation of Sonja and William Jensen. On page 64 (R. 823), Sonja Jensen again
testified that William Jensen told her specifically that he owned an 8% interest in Summit
as reflected in the un-executed written agreement (R.655-623), and that once the DaVita
lawsuit was over, and William Jensen's non-compete contract was of no effect then the
8% would be given to him, which it was in said agreement. (R. 824.)
j.

On pages 65-68 Sonja Jensen discusses the 8% ownership interest of

15

William Jensen in Summit, through Focus and some of the terms, which again were
reduced to writing, and the consideration for the 8% interest and the waiver of the
$34,000.00 capital contribution. (R. 824)
k.

On pages 89-92 (R. 826), Sonja Jensen discusses the Exhibit "9" (R.

849) to her deposition and explains how said Exhibit verifies her contention that an 8%
interest in Summit was given to her husband through Focus. (R. 826.)
1.

On pages 93-96 (R. 827), Sonja Jensen's specifically discusses the

conversations that took place in her home in regards to the ownership she claims to have
in Summit. (R. 827.)
m.

On pages 109-116 (R. 828-829), she again discusses Exhibit "10",

the East Valley Operating Agreement and Exhibit "4", (R. 655-673) the un-executed
written agreement, and the basis for her claim that the Plaintiffs have an ownership
therein, and how the terms were arrived at and agreed to by Mr. Santelli on behalf of
Summit.
n.

On pages 135-142 of Sonja Jensen's deposition she discusses the

meetings held in her home where William Jensen's 8% ownership in Summit was
discussed and agreed upon. (R. 830-831.)
o.

On pages 151-158, Sonja Jensen discusses again the 8% interest. (R.

832-833.)
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p.

On pages 167-174, Sonja Jensen discusses the $8,000.00 that

William Jensen was going to get on a monthly basis from his interest in Summit and the
fact that he received one such payment. (R. 835-836.)
q.

On pages 179-182, Sonja Jensen again discusses Exhibit "4", (R.

837) and the 8% ownership interest in Summit.
r.

On pages 189-190, Sonja Jensen discusses the consideration given

for the ownership interest in Summit. (R. 838.)
s.

On pages 203-214, Sonja Jensen discusses the fact that William

Jensen was continuing to do the work for Summit after June of 2003 that he was doing
prior to June of 2003, which was contemplated in the Exhibit "4" agreement. (R. 839841.)
t.

On pages 219-226, Sonja Jensen testifies in regard to the conspiracy

between Mr. Santelli and William Jensen to wait until the DaVita lawsuit was settled
before Focus, through William Jensen, obtained the ownership interest and the
involvement of William Jensen in regard to the same. (R. 842-843.)
u.

On pages 231-238, Sonja Jensen discusses the breach of the

agreement in Exhibit "4" (R. 844-845) due to the separation of Sonja and William Jensen.
v.

Various documents which are attached to Sonja Jensen's affidavit

support her contention of the 8% ownership interest in Summit. (R. 846-863.) Further,
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Sonja's letter (R. 915-916) summarizes her position.
In regards to Appellee, William Jensen's Motion to Dismiss the Intervention
claim, Sonja Jensen gained the rights and authority to file the lawsuit on behalf of Focus
Enterprises L.L.C. and The William A. Jensen Family Partnership as per the stipulation
between William Jensen and Sonja Jensen as stated in the Motion to Intervene filed the
1st of August, 2006. (R. 475-477.) Sonja Jensen was finally awarded, by decree of the
divorce, all rights, title, and interest in and to the entities pursuant to the stipulation made
by William Jensen in the divorce action, civil number 034905158. (R. 1089-1099.) The
Court failed to allow Focus and The William A. Jensen Family Partnership to Intervene
even though Sonja Jensen had the authority to act in their behalf and request that they be
included in the above litigation. The reason that the Court dismissed the two entities had
been eliminated and there was no reason as to why they should not have been allowed to
again be Plaintiffs. (R. 475-477.)

STATEMENT OF SOME MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
1. Whether or not there was an oral contract between the parties in regard to
conveying an interest in Summit?
2. Was the oral contract reduced to a written agreement between the parties?
3. Was the written agreement the final agreement?

18

4. Did the Defendants fail to sign the contract to prevent Sonja Jensen from having
an interest?
5. Was the capital contribution of William and Sonja Jensen through Focus waived?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant respectfully argues that the Trial Court failed to consider the
material issues of facts in dispute in regards to the oral agreement which was reduced to
writing. The Trial Court should have applied the relevant law and correctly determined
that disputed issues of material facts existed.
The Appellant respectfully contends that the Trial Court abused its discretion
when it denied Focus Enterprises L.L.C. and the William A. Jensen Family Limited
Partnership Motion to Intervene and the Renewed Motion to Intervene after Sonja Jensen
was given the authority to act on behalf of the said two entities in the divorce action
between Sonja Jensen and William Jensen.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Failed to Determine that there were Material Facts in
Dispute in Regards to the Agreement which Requires Reversal of the
Summary Judgment.
The Trial Court decision should be reversed because the Trial Court made an error

in not finding that there were material issues of facts in dispute over the oral agreement
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that was reduced to writing thus resulting in a breach of contract. The material facts
stated that are in dispute is sufficient cause to render the summary judgment
inappropriate.
In Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, % 16, 73 P.3d 325, the Court stated,
"In deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate, we need review only whether
the trial court erred in applying the relevant law and whether a material fact was in
dispute." Another case that states material issues of fact need to be decided by a judge is
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein, & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292. "[i]t is not the purpose of the
summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or
witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to
resolve disputed issues of fact." Additionally, in Sarins v. Butter field Ford, the court
explained how an issue of material fact could be inquired. "A genuine issue of fact exists
where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether
defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard." Sanns v. Butterfield Ford,
2004 UT App 203, ^ 6, 94 P.3d 301 (quoting Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615
(Utah 1982)). The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's summary judgment rulings
for correctness. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99, 22 P.3d 784. The Court of
Appeals of Utah stated,
"We consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." This
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is the standard of review we apply because summary judgment is
appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99, % 7, 22 P.3d 784 (quoting Surety
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, 2000 UT 71, ^ 14, 10 P.3d 338).
The Supreme Court of Utah stated, In the Matter of Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17,
71 P.3d 589, "The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents a
questions of both law and fact." "Whether a contract has been formed is ultimately a
conclusion of law. But that ordinarily depends on the resolution of subsidiary issues of
fact." Nunley v. Westates Casting Serv., Inc., 1999 UT 100 17, 989 P.2d 1077, 1083
(quoting O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290-91 (Utah 1981)). In Flake, there was a
meeting which resulted in an oral agreement that was later memorialized in a writing
which was not signed. This Court went on to say in paragraph 78, "[i]n determining
whether the parties created an enforceable contract, a court should consider all
preliminary negotiations, offers, and counter-offers, and interpret the various expressions
of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether the parties reached an agreement on
complete and definite terms." The Court in Flake ruled, that an oral agreement was
reached between the parties and reduced to writing, and even though it was not signed, it
was binding. In the present case, there were numerous meetings between Mr. Santelli,
for Summit, and William Jensen on behalf of Focus, wherein the specific terms were
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discusses and agreed upon, as stated in the affidavit of Sonja Jensen (R. 809-917) and the
written agreement (R. 655-673) was prepared based upon said terms, although the same
was not signed, as indicated above.
In the present case the Trail Court apparently ruled that Sonja Jensen's affidavit
contradicts her deposition testimony. In Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 2006 UT App
304, \ 13, 141 P.3d 624, the plaintiffs affidavit contradicted his deposition testimony.
However, the affidavit submitted after the Barrnetf s deposition explained the apparent
discrepancy between his prior affidavits and his deposition. See Best. The Court held
that in order for an issue of fact to be raised by an affiant, there must be an explanation
for the discrepancy. See Best. The Court further reasoned that it is only necessary to
show facts which invalidate the facts stated by the opposing party to create a material fact
issue. See Best. The Court states, "[i]t only takes one sworn statement under oath to
dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact."
Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp. 2006 UT App 304, \ 10, 141 P.3d 624 (quoting WM
Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981)). As long as there is
a material fact issue raised, summary judgment is not appropriate.
Like Best, Sonja Jensen's affidavit after her deposition reasonably explained the
discrepancy regarding the agreement with ownership interest in Summit. In Sonja
Jensen's deposition, when she was asked what agreement she was suing for in her
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Complaint, she specifically stated there were three written agreements. These
agreements are the East Valley Operating Agreement, the West Valley Operating
Agreement, and the June 19, 2003 unsigned written agreement of Summit. (R. 655-673.)
This statement alone reasonably explain the so-called discrepancy that the Appellees
claim there was between the affidavit and the deposition thus showing that there is a
material fact issue here in question.
Sonja Jensen's answer of "No other oral agreements" (R. 722) indicated she had
already talked about the Pasadena and Austin dialysis centers, but she was not asserting
in this litigation that there were any oral agreements in regards to receiving an ownership
interest in those dialysis centers although Sonja Jensen believes that in fact there were.
The Appellee contends that there is a discrepancy in the affidavit and the deposition that
was taken. However, there is no discrepancy. Sonja Jensen states in her deposition,
numerous times, that there are unwritten agreements in regards to the dialysis centers
involved with Summit.
Furthermore, when Sonja Jensen was asked in her deposition (R. 821), what
written agreements she was referring to, she stated there are the East Valley Operating
Agreement and the West Valley Operating Agreement. Then asked, "Ok, so you're
telling me that so far there are two written agreements that you're referring to in
paragraph 51 of the Complaint; is that right?" She responded with, "Right." Then asked,
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"Are there more written agreements?" Sonja Jensen responded, "There is the agreement
that his name, William Jensen, was taken off of, from the 6-19 draft of the Summit."
These statements show that Sonja Jensen inferred the oral agreement that is being
contested to as the drafted written agreement of June 19, 2003, that was never signed by
her husband. Even though this written contract was never signed, it shows that there was
a meeting of the minds about William Jensen's interest in Summit. Finally after two
years and the DaVita settlement being finalized, William Jensen's interest in Summit was
able to be reduced to writing and not just orally agreed upon between the parties.
However, Sonja Jensen even stated that when the partners found out that William Jensen
and Sonja Jensen were filing for divorce, this unsigned writing again was changed and
the interest of the Jensen's, through Focus, disappeared. The only change in the revised
written agreement, that was signed, was the deletion of Focus. (R. 675-715.)
There are numerous substantial and material issues of fact that are in dispute as
stated here in above. The Appellees position, apparently adopted by the Trial Court, was
that Sonja Jensen admitted in her deposition that there were no oral agreements.
However, that apparent discrepancy was reasonably explained by Sonja Jensen. In Sonja
Jensen's mind, this was not an oral agreement because the terms of the oral agreement
were reduced to a written agreement. (R. 655-673.) This is the reason Sonja Jensen
answered, in her deposition, that the suit did not deal with an oral contract. However,
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Sonja Jensen is not purported to know the law in the same manner as an attorney who has
been educated on the underlying matters that make up the law. Sonja Jensen only
answered the questions honestly, and to the best of her ability, and in doing so made clear
that this lawsuit had to deal with an agreement between Summit and the Jensens, through
Focus, and that said agreement had been breached. Further, the apparent discrepancy
between Sonja Jensen deposition and her affidavit, relied upon by the Appellees, taken in
the context given is in and of itself a material issue of fact which would preclude an
award of Summary Judgment.

II.

The Trial Court Erred in not granting the Intervention of the parties prior to
Summary Judgment.
It is undisputed that after the Trial Court granted defendants, William Jensen's

Motion to Dismiss the Family Partnership and Focus as plaintiffs, in the above action on
the 21 st of June 2006, the plaintiff, Sonja Jensen, was given authority to act on behalf of
the Family Partnership and Focus as stated in her Motion to Intervene and Memorandum
in Support Thereof filed on the 1st of August, 2006. (R. 475-477.) It is also undisputed
that no opposition to said Motion to Intervene was filed by any of the defendants prior to
the Court's minute entry dated the 22nd of November 2006 (R. 759) where the Court
denied the Motion to Intervene. Further it is undisputed that in plaintiffs Motion to
Intervene (R. 475-476) Sonja Jensen, through her attorney, specifically stated that
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William Jensen had stipulated and agreed that plaintiff, Sonja Jensen, would be awarded
all the rights, titles, and interest in the three entities, to wit Focus, Family Partnership, and
the Family Trust, and therefore had the authority to proceed forward to have said entities
intervene in this action.
It is also undisputed that the Trial Court did not consider the Renewed Motion to
Intervene at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment on the 12th of March,
2007 and summarily denied the Renewed Motion on the 21 st of June, 2007 (R. 1117)
claiming that the Motion to Intervene was implicitly denied by the Court when it granted
Summary Judgment by order dated May 25, 2007. The Renewed Motion to Intervene
filed on the 7th of December, 2006, was never argued at the hearing on the Motion for
Summary Judgment on the 12th of March, 2007 since the same was not noticed for the
oral argument by any of the parties or the Court.
If the Trial Court had not granted the Summary Judgment, then there would not
have been any basis for the Court to have denied the Renewed Motion to Intervene since
the Decree of Divorce awarding the interest in the entities to Sonja Jensen would have
eliminated the concern of the Court and the basis for its initial ruling granting William
Jensen's Motion to Dismiss Focus and Family Partnership as plaintiffs. The Initial
Motion for Intervene filed August of 2006 should not have been denied because there
was no opposition by the defendants, and the Motion indicated that the concern as to
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whether or not Sonja Jensen had the authority to act on behalf of said entities had been
resolved. State by and through Utah State Dept. of Social Serv. v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882
(Utah 1996). The Intervention would not have delayed or complicated the pending
action. Interstate v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App 1997).
As the Court is well aware it is necessary for the Trial Court, if possible, to
eliminate unnecessary duplication in litigation. "No one will gainsay that accuracy is
always to be desired. But there should be no penalty or adverse effect for mere error
which causes no harm. We hold that the matter of intervention was properly before the
Court, and that it was error for the Court to rule as it did." Centuiran Corp. v. Cripps, 577
P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1978) (quoting Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., Utah,
545 P.2d 507 (1976)). Since Focus was the entity used by the Jensens to obtain the
interest in Summit, it is apparent that they are necessary plaintiffs to the litigation and
they should be allowed to intervene as plaintiffs in the litigation.

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Summary Judgment should not have been granted by the Trial
Court for the reason that Sonja Jensen in her affidavit and deposition presented
numerous material issues of fact that were in dispute. Sonja Jensen's statement in her
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deposition that there was no unwritten agreement between the parties was misinterpreted
by the Court and the Appellees. Further, the apparent discrepancy between Sonja
Jensen's deposition and affidavit was fully explained by Sonja Jensen and was taken out
of context based upon all the other representation in her deposition as to the oral
agreement that was reduced to an unexecuted written agreement. Based upon the
forgoing the granting of the Summary Judgment should reversed. Sonja Jensen is entitled
to her day in Court and a trier-of-fact should be allowed to determine whether or not there
was an agreement between the parties in Summit.
If this Court reverses the Trial Court's granting of the Summary Judgment then it
follows that the Motion to Intervene should then be considered by the Trial Court. In
addition, the Trial Court's denial of the initial Motion to Intervene should be reversed,
and Focus and the Family Partnership should be entitled to pursue the litigation.

DATED: Friday, October 26, 2007.

£-£^L
RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for the Appellant
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary under U.R.A.P. Rule 24(a)(l 1).

